COMMENT
THE NEW JERSEY TORT CLAIMS ACT:
A STEP FORWARD?
INTRODUCTION

The New Jersey Tort Claims Act,' a comprehensive statutory
scheme for selectively abolishing governmental immunity in tort, became effective on July 1, 1972. During its relatively short existence, the
Tort Claims Act has generated much criticism from both the bar 2 and
the bench3 with regard to several important provisions. This comment
will analyze the potential impact of the Tort Claims Act and propose
recommendations designed to alleviate constitutional, procedural, and
administrative problems inherent in the structure of the Act. In order
to place the present Act in the proper perspective, a brief review of
New Jersey case law relating to sovereign immunity prior to the passage
of the Act is necessary.
I.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

State Immunity
The doctrine of sovereign immunity evolved from English feudal
society. It was initially premised on the theory that to allow a suit
4
against the king was inconsistent with the concept of his sovereignty.
I N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:1-1 et seq. (Supp. 1973-74).
2 Considerable criticism of the Tort Claims Act has come from all sectors of the New
Jersey Bar. See, e.g., Letter from Warren W. Faulk, Esq., to author, July 20, 1973, on file
at the Seton Hall Law Review; Letter from Middlesex County Trial Lawyers Association
to Editor, May 17, 1973, in 96 N.J.L.J. 605 (1973), in which the Association's Legislative
Committee presented a scathing attack against the $1,000 threshold requirement for pain
and suffering recovery under the Act (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:9-2d (Supp. 1973-74)). Written"
text of the Tort Claims Act Review Meeting (sponsored by the New Jersey Branch of the
Association of Trial Lawyers of America [hereinafter referred to as ATLA]), held on
June 2, 1972 at Cherry Hill, New Jersey [hereinafter referred to as the Cherry Hill Review
Meeting]. The text is in preparation at this time and will be distributed by ATLA. Conversations with Herbert E. Greenstone, President of the New Jersey Branch of ATLA, July
16, 1973; Richard J. Levinson of the Trial Lawyers Association of Middlesex County, June
28, 1973; Warren W. Faulk, Esq., of Camden, Sept. 5, 1973.
3 Conversations with the Honorable Sonia Morgan, Judge of the Essex County Court,
June 21, 1973. See Judge Morgan's comments on the written text of the Cherry Hill Review
Meeting.
4 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 0255; see generally 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND,
THE HIsrORY OF ENGUSH LAw 515 (2d ed. 1898); W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS § 131, at
284
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At a later time, this theory merged with the concept that the king was
above reproach:
The rule . . . [is] expressed by the phrase 'The king can do
no wrong'. . . . That you can neither sue nor prosecute the king
is a simple fact .... The king can do no wrong; he can break the

law; he is below the law, though he is below no man and below no
court of law. 5
However, this was a qualified exemption, since some minister was always held responsible for every act of the king.6
New Jersey has traditionally adhered to the concept of the sovereign's immunity as exemplified in Lodor v. Baker, Arnold & Co., 7 in

which a New Jersey supreme court asserted that the state
enjoys this immunity as one of the essential attributes of sovereignty, it being an established principle of jurisprudence in all
civilized nations, that the sovereign cannot be sued in its own
courts without its consent.8
Nonetheless, there has been a gradual judicial erosion of the cloak of
immunity in selected areas. The doctrine was held to bar neither suits
in mandamus to enforce a state official to perform a ministerial duty,9
nor actions for injunctions to prevent a state agency from taking unconstitutional action.' 0 The state could thus be sued to compel condemnation of private property which had been effectively taken for the
public use,"' or for payment of local real estate taxes on property
2
which had been condemned for public use.'
970 (4th ed. 1971); Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 1, 129, 229
(1926); Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort (pts. 5 & 6), 36 YALE L.J. 757, 1039
(1926-27).
5 1 F. POLLOCK &F. MAIrLAND, supra note 4, at 515-16.
6 W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 971.
7 39 N.J.L. 49 (Sup. Ct. 1876).
8 Id. at 50.
9 Jersey City v. Zink, 133 N.J.L. 437, 44 A.2d 825 (Ct. Err. & App. 1945), cert. denied,
326 U.S. 797 (1946), where the court stated:
It is the essence of a prerogative writ, such as mandamus, that it is an appeal to
the crown or sovereign state to remedy whatever may be amiss in the conduct of
its public affairs, because the administration thereof is not chargeable to the crown
personally or the state, but is chargeable to the ministers or officers who are accountable to the people.
The action on mandamus, therefore, instead of being a suit against the

state, is against its servants to compel them to do that duty, which by accepting
office, they agreed to perform ....
133 N.J.L. at 440, 44 A.2d at 827.
10 Abelson's, Inc. v. State Bd. of Optometrists, 5 N.J. 412, 417-18, 75 A.2d 867, 869
(1950).
11 Haycock v. Jannarone, 99 N.J.L. 183, 185, 122 A. 805, 806 (Ct. Err. & App. 1923).
12 See, e.g., East Orange v. Palmer, 47 N.J. 307, 220 A.2d 679 (1966). See REPORT OF
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In addition to these judicially established exceptions to sovereign
immunity, the New Jersey legislature has created various governmental
agencies and local entities which can sue or be sued. 13 The Supreme
14
Court of New Jersey, in Taylor v. New Jersey Highway Authority,'
construed this grant of power to sue or be sued as legislative consent
to actions in tort against the specific state agency or local body.' 5
In 1970, two landmark cases which foreshadowed the present legislation, P, T & L Construction Co. v. Commissioner, Department of
Transportation,16 and Willis v. Department of Conservation & Economic Development,17 were decided by the New Jersey supreme court.
The court's holdings in these cases severely limited the application of
the sovereign immunity doctrine in New Jersey both in contract and
tort actions.
P, T & L Construction Co. involved an action brought against the
state on a public construction contract in which the state, by way of
answer, alleged delay in job completion.' The court asserted that the
judiciary should entertain actions against the state on contracts the latter had authorized, despite the court's inability to enforce a judgment
against the state, on the theory that the state would recognize its obligation to honor an adverse judgment.' 9 Soon after the P, T & L ConTHE AroRNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON SOVEREIGN IMMUNrY 31 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as TASK FORCE REPORT].
13 TASK FORCE REPORT at 31-34 (listing those agencies and local entities which have

been permitted to sue and be sued together with the pertinent statutory citations).
14 22 N.J. 454, 126 A.2d 313 (1956).
15 Id. at 468, 126 A.2d at 320. The case involved an action brought by a guest of a
tenant against the New Jersey Highway Authority for injuries suffered in a fall in a common stairway of a multi-family dwelling. Id. at 457, 126 A.2d at 314. The supreme court
asserted that the doctrine of sovereign immunity did not apply to a state agency authorized to sue or be sued:
[O]ur courts have indicated that a statutory provision empowering an independent
Authority of the State to sue and be sued will be construed as a waiver of the
State's immunity.
Id. at 468, 126 A.2d at 320.
16 55 N.J. 341, 262 A.2d 195 (1970).
17 55 N.J. 534, 264 A.2d 34 (1970).
18 55 N.J. at 342, 262 A.2d at 196.
19 Id. at 345-46, 262 A.2d at 198. The court went on to state that:
If our coordinate branches made it plain that they would be indifferent to our
judgments in such matters, we would indeed be loath to be party to the spectacle
such a conflict of wills would create. But there is no reason to suppose that our
efforts will be ignored. The immunity concept is judge-made. Its roots are hard
to find . . . . []he judiciary ought not to withhold its hand on a mere assumption that its coordinate branches would want it that way.
Id. at 346, 262 A.2d at 198.
Subsequent to this decision, the legislature enacted the New Jersey Contractual Liability Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:13-1 et seq. (Supp. 1973-74), which expressly waives sovereign
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struction Co. decision, the supreme court made its second major pronouncement in the area of sovereign immunity. In Willis, the court
held that an infant could recover damages against the state in tort for
injuries suffered while feeding a caged bear at a state-run recreational
facility. 20 The court, however, cautioned that the state would not be
liable for decisions requiring the exercise of official judgment or discretion, thereby invoking the same limitation utilized by the courts in
21
determining municipal liability.

Municipal Immunity
The basic concept of municipal immunity dates back to the English case of Russell v. The Men of Devon.22 In this case a suit brought
against an unincorporated county for negligence in failing to repair a
bridge was dismissed 23 primarily on a public policy basis that the
aggrieved individual rather than "the public should suffer an inconvenience." 24 A municipal entity's immunity from suit was enunciated
at an early date by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Freeholders of
Sussex v. Strader,25 in which Chief Justice Hornblower in a concurring
opinion asserted that:
immunity arising out of either an express contract or one implied in fact. Punitive or
consequential damages are not permitted. Further, claims based upon implied warranties or implied in law contracts are disallowed. Id. § 59:13-3. Agencies which are statutorily authorized to sue or be sued are exempted from the provisions of the Act. Id.
§ 59:13-2.
20 55 N.J. at 535-36, 264 A.2d at 34-35. While declaring that "[i]t is time for the
judiciary to accept a like responsibility and adjudicate the tort liability of the State itself,"
the court cautioned that no exact set of guiding principles would be enunciated; rather,
such principles would evolve on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 540, 264 A.2d at 37.
21 Id. at 540-41, 264 A.2d at 37.
22 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788).
23 Id. at 359-60, 363.
24 Id. at 362. The court also considered the fact that there had been no remedy in
tort against the inhabitants of a township in the past, that Devon was not an incorporated
entity, and that even if it were, there was no fund from which to pay the claim. Id.
At early English law, municipalities were unincorporated entities with few political
rights. By the fifteenth century, the municipalities began to incorporate and by the sixteenth
century, borough corporations were well established and fully recognized. Comment, A Survey of Municipal Immunity in New Jersey, 3 SETON HALL L. REv. 416, 417 n.8 (1972).- See
also 19 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA, MUNICIPALITIES 589, 590 (1956); 11 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES, Municipal Corporation86, 87 (1933).
For a basic survey of the development of municipal immunity, see D. JONES, NECLICENCE OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 16 (1892); Borchard, Government Liability in Tort,
34 YALE L.J. 129 (1924); Weintraub & Conford, Tort Liability of Municipalities in New
Jersey, 3 MERCER BEASLEY L. REv. 142 (1934); Note, Municipal Tort Liability: An Emerging
Standard in New Jersey, 1 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 69 (1969).
25 18 N.J.L. 108 (Sup. Ct. 1840).
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[I]f such corporation, owe a duty to the public, and neglect to
perform it, although every individual comprising that public, is
thereby injured, some more, and some less, yet they can have no
private remedy, at the common law.2 6

The Strader rationale was gradually modified in favor of increased
municipal liability in later judicial rulings.2 7 As an aid to the courts
in determining the extent of immunity from suit to be accorded a
municipal entity, an attempt was made to distinguish the activities performed by the entity on the basis of whether they were governmental
or proprietary in nature. In general, when a determination was made
that the entity was performing a governmental function, it was deemed
to be an agent of the state and, as such, would be protected to the same
degree as the state under the latter's sovereign immunity. 2 On the
other hand, when the entity was determined to be acting in its proprietary or corporate capacity, it could be sued as any other private
29
individual who is accused of tortious conduct.
Unfortunately, the distinction between proprietary and governmental functions has not been well-defined, resulting in the evolution
of rather ambiguous guidelines which have constituted more of a
Id. at 121 (Hornblower, C.J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
See Karpenski v. Borough of South River, 83 N.J.L. 149, 83 A. 639 (Sup. Ct. 1912)
(governmental-proprietary test established for determining municipal immunity from
liability); Hart v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 57 N.J.L. 90, 29 A. 490 (Sup. Ct. 1894)
(action permitted against a municipality for injury inflicted on plantiff resulting from its
active wrongdoing); Bergen v. Koppenal, 97 N.J. Super. 265, 235 A.2d 30 (App. Div. 1967),
aff'd as modified, 52 N.J. 478, 246 A.2d 442 (1968) (where a duty is imposed on a municipality to act, and its failure to act results in injury to a private party, an action exists
against the municipality if its judgment was palpably unreasonable).
28 The New Jersey supreme court first enunciated this distinction as dictum in Tomlin
v. Hildreth, 65 N.J.L. 438, 441-42, 47 A. 649, 650 (Sup. Ct. 1900), and later based .the holding in Karpenski v. Borough of South River, 83 N.J.L. 149, 151, 83 A. 639, 641 (Sup. Ct.
1912) on this premise. In Fahey v. Jersey City, 52 N.J. 103, 244 A.2d 97 (1968), the court,
while expressing dissatisfaction with the distinction, nonetheless indicated various criteria
useful in determining whether a given municipal function is governmental:
[T]he fact that an activity was historically engaged in by local government; that it
is uniformly so furnished today; that it could not be performed as well by a private corporation; that it is not undertaken for profit or for revenue; and, most
significantly, that it is within the imperative public duties imposed on a municipality as agent of the State.
Id. at 108-09, 244 A.2d at 100. See also Comment, supra note 24, at 423-24.
29 Caporossi v. Atlantic City, 220 F. Supp. 508, 523 (D.N.J. 1963), aU'd per curiam,
328 F.2d 620 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 825 (1964). In Caporossi,Judge Cohen gives an
excellent review of the development of this dichotomy in New Jersey. See also Cloyes v.
Township of Delaware, 23 N.J. 324, 332-34, 129 A.2d 1, 5-7 (1957); Weeks v. City of Newark,
62 N.J. Super. 166, 174, 162 A.2d 314, 319 (App. Div. 1960), afJ'd per curiam, 34 N.J. 250, 168
A.2d 11 (1961).
26
27
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hindrance than an aid to the courts.30 To further confuse the matter,
an additional exception to municipal entity immunity was developed
whereby a municipality, although performing a governmental function, could still be held liable for acts constituting active wrongdoing.3 1
This concept rendered a municipality liable for an overt act in the
causation chain leading directly to the injury as contrasted with its
mere inaction or nonfeasance.3 2 Some rather interesting aspects of this
test manifested themselves in Hayden v. CurIey.3 3 In this decision, New
Jersey's supreme court ruled that the affirmative act could occur prior
to a non-active negligent act and need not be of a tortious nature, so
34
long as the totality of the acts constituted active wrongdoing.
Recently, the validity of the above standards as indicia of municipal
liability has been severely questioned, 35 and a somewhat more viable
approach has been adopted in their place. The modern test looks to
whether the act is discretionary or ministerial in nature; that is,
whether the act involves either a basic policy decision or the actual
30 See, e.g., B.W. King, Inc. v. Town of West New York, 49 N.J. 318, 230 A.2d 133
(1967), where the court asserted:
Rather than to base liability upon a finding that the municipality's function ...
was either proprietary or governmental and to compound the confusion, we prefer
....
[Not to] add to the perpetuation of the controversial dichotomy.
Id. at 326, 230 A.2d at 137.
31 Hart v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 57 N.J.L. 90, 92-93, 29 A. 490, 491 (Sup. Ct.
1894).
32 Hoy v. Capelli, 48 N.J. 81, 84-86, 222 .A.2d 649, 650-51 (1966).
33 34 N.J. 420, 169 A.2d 809 (1961).
34 Justice Proctor, writing for the court, voiced support for the active wrongdoing doctrine:
It is the omission which transmutes the condition created by the prior affirmative
act from a lawful obstruction into a nuisance. The affirmative act of creation and
the accompanying or subsequent omission form a sequence of events leading up to
and causing injury to the traveler. Our courts have held that an affirmative act in
the causative sequence resulting in injury is sufficient to sustain municipal liability. The last event in the sequence may be non-action, but the total sequence constitutes active wrongdoing.
Id. at 425-26, 169 A.2d at 812. For a discussion of the apparent demise of this rule, see notes
178-82 infra and accompanying text.
35 See, e.g., B.W. King, Inc. v. Town of West New York, 49 N.J. 318, 324-25, 230 A.2d
133, 136-37 (1967), wherein the court asserted:
Municipal immunity from tort liability and the proprietary-governmental test have
fallen into considerable disrepute. ...
The difficulty with the articulation of a substitutionary rule lies in the ascertainment and expression of a perimeter for liability. It is most difficult if not impossible to academically visualize all the possible sets of circumstances which could
give rise to a claimed municipal liability. There results an inability to state in
advance a positive standard for that purpose. . . . The problem should be approached by the court on a gradual case by case basis . ...
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implementation of such a decision. 36 As asserted by Chief Justice Wein-

traub in Fitzgerald v. Palmer: 7
[T]here is a political discretion as to what ought to be done, as to
priorities, and as to how much should be raised by taxes or borrowed to that end. If government does act, then, when it acts in a
manner short of ordinary prudence, liability could be judged as
in the case of a private party.... [As to a discretionary act] the
question is whether a judge or jury could review the policy or
political decisions involved without in effect taking over the responsibility and power of those other branches. 38
The rationale behind the ministerial-discretionary dichotomy was probably best enunciated in Amelchenko v. Borough of Freehold.39 Justice
36 See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Palmer, 47 N.J. 106, 109-10, 219 A.2d 512, 514 (1966); Amelchenko v. Borough of Freehold, 42 N.J. 541, 549-50, 201 A.2d 726, 730-31 (1964).
The ministerial-discretionary dichotomy developed from court interpretation and analysis of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970). Key cases in the evolution of
the distinction are Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955), and Dalehite v.
United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953). Professor Davis has attempted to extract guiding principles from these cases in applying the test:
1. The government probably is not liable for negligence in planning "at a
planning rather than operational level."
2. The statutory concept of "a discretionary function," with respect to which
the government is not liable whether or not the discretion involved be abused,
probably is limited to the planning level and probably does not include functions
at the operational level even if those functions involve discretion.
3. The location of the line between the planning and operational levels is yet
to be worked out, but the government is probably immune from liability for negligence in "a plan developed at a high level under a direct delegation of planmaking authority from the apex of the Executive Department."
4. The line between the planning and operational levels may depend not
merely upon the position of the actor in the government hierarchy but may depend in part on whether the negligence is "in policy decisions of a regulatory or
governmental nature" or whether the negligence relates to "actions akin to those
of a private manufacturer, contractor, or shipper."
5. "When an official exerts governmental authority in a manner which legally
binds one or many," the government probably is not liable.
6. The test of government liability does not depend upon the governmentalproprietary distinction. The government may be liable for negligence at the operational level, even if the function performed is governmental.
7. Negligence in regulating or in failing to regulate through resort to legislative power probably does not subject the government to liability.
8. Absolute liability without fault does not arise even if the government handles an inherently dangerous commodity or engages in an-extra-hazardous activity.
9. The government may be liable for negligence in performing a function
even if the function has no counterpart in the activities of private persons.
10. The government may be liable for negligence in performing a service
which neither the government nor the agency nor the officers have an obligation
to undertake.
3 K. DAvIs, ADMINIsTRATiVE LAW TREATISE § 25.10, at 479-82 (1958) (footnotes omitted).
37 47 N.J. 106, 219 A.2d 512 (1966).
38 Id. at 109-10, 219 A.2d at 514.
39 42 N.J. 541, 201 A.2d 726 (1964).
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Francis, writing for the court, asserted that acts requiring judgment
or discretion on the part of the public entity or employee should not
.be the subject of review in a tort action because public officials must
be free to govern "without fear of liability either for themselves or for
the public entity they represent. It cannot be a tort for government to
govern.

40

The need for the legislature to enter the field and establish uniform guidelines upon which to predicate both state and local liability
was recognized by the court in Willis.41 The court, however, also spoke

of the difficulty inherent in structuring such legislation.
[T]he subject so defies precise statement that inevitably the conbe developed case by case even if the Legtrolling concepts must
42
islature does speak.
Spurred by these decisions and the recommendations of the State
Attorney General's Task Force on Sovereign Immunity, the legislature
enacted the present Tort Claims Act. Whether the Act represents a
step forward in providing a rational solution to the problems existing
in this area of the law or merely confirms the court's caveat that the
problem defies a precise solution can best be ascertained by scrutinizing
the Act itself.
II.

NON-PROBLEM

AREAS OF INTEREST

Approach
The Act, in essence, reestablishes the immunity of all public entities in New Jersey to actions sounding in tort, 43 subject to specific
exceptions 44 which have generally been adopted from prior New Jersey
case law. 45 In this respect the legislative approach to sovereign im40

Id. at 550, 201 A.2d at 730-31.

41 55 N.J. at 538-39, 264 A.2d at 36.
42

Id. at 539, 264 A.2d at 37.

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-la, Comment (Supp. 1973-74). See Harris v. State, 61 N.J.
585, 297 A.2d 561 (1972), in which the New Jersey supreme court stated in dictum that
"[t]he recently enacted New Jersey Tort Claims Act continues this [sovereign] immunity in
its pertinent aspects." Id. at 589, 297 A.2d at 563. As for the Act's effect on municipal liabiliity, see Barney's Furniture Warehouse v. City of Newark, 62 N.J. 456, 303 A.2d 76 (1973),
in which the supreme court again stated by way of dictum that "[t]he act seems intended
to codify existing case law in the area of exercise of governmental discretion by municipalities." Id. at 470 n.4, 303 A.2d at 83.
44 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-1 (Supp. 1973-74) and accompanying comment.
45 Compare id. § 59:2-3d and accompanying comment with Bergen v. Koppenal, 52
N.J. 478, 246 A.2d 442 (1968), and Fitzgerald v. Palmer, 47 N.J. 106, 219 A.2d 512 (1966).
Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:4-2 (Supp. 1973-74) and accompanying comment with
43
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munity differs from that suggested by the New Jersey supreme court
in B. W. King, Inc. v. Town of West New York 46 in which the court
questioned "whether there is any reason why [immunity] should apply." 4t The more restrictive approach to sovereign immunity favored by
the framers of the Act was apparently the result of a public policy
decision to insure that a basis existed for estimating the amount of
4
funds to be budgeted each year for such actions.
Vicarious Liability-N.J.Stat. Ann. § 59:2-2
The Act applies the principle of vicarious liability49 to all public
entities for injury, including property damage as well as bodily injury,
proximately caused by an act or omission of a public employee falling
within the scope of his employment. 50 However, public entities are
expressly exempted from liability for injuries resulting from acts or
omissions of a public employee when he is not liable, 51 when his conduct is outside the scope of his employment, 52 or when the act or omis53
sion is criminal, fraudulent, malicious or willful in nature.
Ministerial-DiscretionaryDichotomy-N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:2-3
The Act adopts the ministerial-discretionary dichotomy" in exempting certain discretionary activities. These statutory exemptions include: "legislative or judicial action or inaction, or administrative
B.W. King, Inc. v. Town of West New York, 49 N.J. 318, 230 A.2d 133 (1967), and Hoy v.
Capelli, 48 N.J. 81, 222 A.2d 649 (1966), and Amelchenko v. Borough of Freehold, 42 N.J.
541, 201 A.2d 726 (1964).
46 49 N.J. 318, 230 A.2d 133 (1967).
47 Id. at 325, 230 A.2d at 137.
48 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 12, at 10; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-1, Comment
(Supp. 1973-74).
49 This concept has been basically derived from the New Jersey supreme court's
pronouncement in McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 33 N.J. 172, 162 A.2d 820 (1960), that local
governments should be responsible for the tortious acts of its employees under certain circumstances on a theory of respondeat superior.Id. at 196, 162 A.2d at 833.
50 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-2a (Supp. 1973-74) and accompanying comment.
51 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-2b (Supp. 1973-74).
52 Id. § 59:2-2a.
53 Id. § 59:2-10. This position adheres to previous New Jersey case law. See, e.g.,
O'Connor v. Harms, 111 N.J. Super. 22, 26, 266 A.2d 605, 607 (App. Div. 1970) where the
court stated that
an artificial legal entity created by law to perform limited governmental functions,
cannot entertain malice, as a public corporation.
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-10, Comment (Supp. 1973-74).
54 See notes 36-40 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the nebulous distinction made between ministerial and discretionary functions.
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action or inaction of a legislative or judicial nature"; 55 the determination of whether or not to seek or provide resources necessary for the
provision of adequate governmental services and facilities; 5 the decision of whether or not to adopt or enforce a law; 57 the determination

of whether or not to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke permits or
licenses;5 8 and the decision to terminate or reduce benefits under a
public assistance program.5 9 The Act, however, under certain circumstances, permits limited judicial review of discretionary acts
when, in the face of competing demands, [a public entity] determines whether and how to utilize or apply existing resources, including those allocated for equipment, facilities and personnel . . .
[and such] determination . . . was palpably unreasonable.6°

Under these conditions, liability may be assessed against the public
entity or public employee for injuries resulting from such a determination. 61 These statutory examples, however, fall far short of clear guidelines for determining when conduct is ministerial or discretionary in
nature. They suggest a recognition on the part of the Task Force and
the legislature of the difficulty inherent in defining these concepts.
Conditions of Public Property-N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 59:4-8, -9
Under the Act, a public entity or a public employee is expressly
immunized from liability "for an injury caused by a condition of any
unimproved public property. '62 This immunity is premised on the
theory that it is virtually impossible to supervise or monitor the physical condition of all the vast acreage set aside for recreation and enjoy63
ment.
On the other hand, immunity from liability with respect to improved public property is limited by the caveat that where a dangerous
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-3b (Supp. 1973-74).
Id. § 59:2-3c.
57 Id. § 59:2-4.
58 Id. § 59:2-5.
59 Id. § 59:2-8.
60 Id. § 59:2-3d.
61 Id. Prior to the Act, in Bergen v. Koppenal, 52 N.J. 478, 246 A.2d 442 (1968), the
court was confronted with the question of whether Wall Township was under a duty to
take over traffic control when its police officer had learned of a misdirected traffic light.
The Koppenal court promulgated a similar standard upon which to base liability:
[T]he municipality may prove the police did not act because of competing-demands upon the police force....
[The jury may not disagree with the police
deployment judgment unless it is palpably unreasonable.
Id. at 480, 246 A.2d at 444 (emphasis added).
62 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:4-8 (Supp. 1973-74). See also id. § 59:4-9.
63 See id. §§ 59:4-8, -9, Comment.
55

56
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condition 64 exists on the property, liability may attach. 65 Specific guidelines are set forth in the Act from which a determination of liability
can be made. Thus, liability may attach if a claimant can prove: (1) that
the property was in a dangerous condition when he was injured; (2)
that the injury was proximately caused by this condition; (3) that the
condition created a foreseeable risk on the type of injury incurred; and
(4) that either a negligent or wrongful act or omission on the part of
an employee of a public entity acting within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition, or the public entity had actual
or constructive notice of this condition within a reasonable time prior
to the injury to require it to take measures to eliminate the dangerous
condition. Even if the plaintiff establishes the above elements, however,
he may still fall short of proving his case if he does not demonstrate
that the action taken by the entity was "palpably unreasonable."' 66
Comparative Negligence-N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:9-4
Under the Act, contributory negligence is no longer a bar to recovery. Instead, the court, or at the discretion of the court, a jury, determines the amount of damages incurred by each party irrespective of his
negligence and the percentage of negligence attributable to each. The
court then diminishes the award in proportion to the amount of negli67
gence attributable to the injured party and enters a judgment.
The Act applies the "pure form" of comparative negligence (presently the law in Mississippi), under which an injured plaintiff is not
barred from recovery despite his contributory negligence so long as he
is not the sole proximate cause of his own injury.6s Other forms of comparative negligence, while considered by the legislature, were ultimately abandoned in favor of the present "pure form," apparently on
the basis that the former were not consistent with the general tenor of
the Act "which is intended to increase settlement and to reasonably and
fairly increase the compensation of injured persons."''
64 "Dangerous condition" is defined in id. § 59:4-la as
a condition of property that creates a substantial risk of injury when such property
is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it
will be used.
65 Id. § 59:4-2.
66 Id.
67 Id. § 59:9-4.
68 Id., Comment.
69 Id. Subsequent to the passage of this Act, the New Jersey legislature enacted the
Comparative Negligence Act, ch. 146, 2 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 239 (1973), which pertains to
civil actions between private parties, and provides in pertinent part:
1. Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person
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III.

ANALYSIS

OF THE PROBLEM AREAS OF

THE NEW JERSEY TORT CLAIMS

ACT

The following discussion will focus upon and analyze some of the
problems endemic to the Act, together with some suggested solutions.
Collateral Source Setoiff-N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:9-2e
Under this provision, a damages award is reduced by the claimant's
collateral sources. 70 Thus, for example, benefits from a private insurance plan, such as Blue Cross-Blue Shield, would be deducted from a
jury damages award, the net award being given to the claimant.
This provision is contrary to the common law collateral source
rule7 ' which provides:
Where a person suffers personal injury or property damage
by reason of the wrongful act of another, an action against the
wrongdoer for the damages suffered is not precluded nor is the
amount of the damages reduced by the receipt by him of payment
72
for his loss from a source wholly independent of the wrongdoer.
or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or
injury to person or property, if such negligence was not greater than the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages sustained
shall be diminished by the percentage sustained of negligence attributable to the
person recovering.
2. In all negligence actions in which the question of liability is in dispute,
the trier of fact shall make the following as findings of fact:
a. The amount of damages which would be recoverable by the injured party
regardless of any consideration of negligence, that is, the full value of the injured
party's damages;
b. The extent, in the form of a percentage, of each parties' [sic] negligence.
The percentage of negligence of each party shall be based on 100% and the total
of all percentages of negligence of all the parties to a suit shall be 100%.
(Emphasis added). Thus, this law conflicts with section 59:9-4 in that a private plaintiff
can recover damages only when his negligence is not greater than that of the defendant.
70 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:9-2e (Supp. 1973-74) provides in pertinent part:
If a claimant receives or is entitled to receive benefits for the injuries allegedly
incurred from a policy or policies of insurance or any other source other than a
joint tortfeasor, such benefits shall be disclosed to the court and the amount thereof
which duplicates any benefit contained in the award shall be deducted from any
award against a public entity or public employee recovered by such claimant; provided, however, that nothing in this provision shall be construed to limit the rights
of a beneficiary under a life insurance policy.
71 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 25.22, at 1343-44 (1956). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 A (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973) [hereinafter cited as
Tent. Draft No. 19].
72 Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Starley, 28 Cal. 2d 347, 349, 170 P.2d 448, 450 (1946).
The "collateral source" doctrine was recognized very early in New Jersey in Weber v.
Morris & Essex R.R., 36 N.J.L. 213, 215 (Sup. Ct. 1873). The rule was defined as prohibiting
a tortfeasor from claiming any benefits which the victim might have received as a result
of the latter's contractual coverage with an insurance carrier. See also Patusco v. Prince
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The wisdom of this common law rule has been the subject of much
discussion. 73 The collateral source rule has been supported on the theory that a damages award is, in a sense, a punitive assessment against
a tortfeasor for the harm he has caused another. Thus, to allow a setoff
of a collateral source recovery against a damages award would permit a
windfall savings to the tortfeasor, thereby diminishing the judgment's
punitive impact. 74 The rationale for this position is similar to the deterrence theory in tort law which asserts "that civil liability is an effective
incentive to care" 75 and "that people will be more careful in their behavior if they know they will be held accountable for the damages of
their misbehavior." 76 Advocates of the common law rule contend that
diminution of a tort recovery should not be allowed since the effect
would be to dissipate the plaintiff's accumulated benefits to which he
77
otherwise would be entitled under a given plan.
Opponents of the collateral source rule assert that the purpose of
tort law is to compensate the injured party, not to punish the tort7
feasor. 8
It may be said that defendant deserves being made to pay
in full because of the moral quality of his act. Now there can be
no question here of who should fairly bear a loss, as between an
innocent and a guilty party, for by hypothesis the innocent man's
Macaroni, Inc., 50 N.J. 365, 368, 235 A.2d 465, 466 (1967); Jacobs v. Jacobs, 99 N.J. Super.
84, 89, 238 A.2d 512, 515 (Ch.), aff'd as modified, 102 N.J. Super. 430, 246 A.2d 135 (App.
Div. 1968).
73 See, e.g., 2 F. HAaRa & F. JAMES, supra note 71, at § 25.22; Tent. Draft No. 19,
supra note 71, at § 920 A; Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in
Tort Law, 54 CAmF. L. REv. 1478 (1966); Maxwell, Collateral Source Rule in the American
Law of Damages,46 MINN. L. REv. 669 (1962); Note, Unreason in the Law of Damages: The
CollateralSource Rule, 77 HARv. L. Ry. 741 (1964).
74 Note, Collateral Source Rule Is Not Applicable to Governmental Agencies Since
It is Punitive in Nature, 7 SAN DEGO L. Rav. 341, 345-47 (1970). See also Tent. Draft
No. 19, supra note 71, § 920 A.
75 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 71, § 25.22, at 1347. Harper and James go on
to assert that while a deterrence effect may in fact exist, nonetheless, it does not justify
maintaining the collateral source rule:
The choice here is not between liability and non-liability for the defendant, but
simply whether his damages shall be diminished by what plaintiff gets from another source. And if that other source is a scheme of social insurance, the amount
it provides is likely to be only a fraction of the damages recoverable at common
law-perhaps a third, a quarter, or less. Altogether it seems unlikely indeed that
anticipation of such an abatement from the flexible and indeterminate damages in
a tort action will materially dilute whatever admonitory value there is in civil
liability.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
78 Note, supra note 74, at 346 (footnote omitted).
77 Id. at 346-47.
78 See id. at 347.
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loss has been made whole and we are discussing a further payment
beyond that. There may be mixed with this feeling of desert a
desire to deter dangerous conduct, but that merits separate treatment. What is left under this head, then, springs from a feeling of
indignation or resentment and a desire to punish as such. Surely
there is no place for such a notion in any philosophy of social insurance. It has no acknowledged place even in tort liability based
on fault, for the theory of damages here is purely compensatory.7 9
Application of the common law collateral source rule requires that
the tortfeasor suffer a detriment, while permitting the plaintiff to gain
a double recovery first, from the collateral source and second, from the
tortfeasor. The net result is punitive in nature, and therefore counter
to the spirit if not the letter of tort law. 0 Thus, the rule is also contrary
to the intent of the Act. Section 59:9-2c prohibits punitive or exemplary damages against a governmental entity,' while section 59:9-2e
expressly provides for collateral source setoff. s2 Hence, the present Act
effectively precludes application of the rule.
While abrogation of the rule may be more in keeping with the
non-punitive spirit of the Act, it has been suggested that the net effect
of this posture constitutes an infringement of the claimant's right to
substantive due process. Thus, by way of analogy, in the context of
a no-fault motor vehicle insurance plan providing for collateral benefits
setoff, it has been argued that if a vested property interest exists in the
collateral benefits, then setoff would constitute an unlawful taking.
It is submitted that the diminution of the value of collateral sources
by denying benefits of insurance, which one is required to pur79 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 71, § 25.22, at 1345 (footnote omitted) (emphasis
in original).
80 Id. § 25.22, at 1345-46.
81 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:9-2c (Supp. 1973-74). In California, the collateral source rule
was held applicable to governmental agencies in Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit
Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 1, 465 P.2d 61, 84 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1970).
It should be recognized that the rule is still generally accepted in the United States.
Id. at 6, 465 P.2d at 63, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 175. The Restatement has proposed the adoption
of the rule:
§ 920 A. Payments Made To Injured Party
(2) Payments made to or benefits conferred on the injured party from other
sources are not credited against the tortfeasor's liability, although they cover all
or a part of the harm for which the tortfeasor is liable.
Tent. Draft No. 19, supra note 71, § 920 A, at 167.
82 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:9-2e (Supp. 1973-74) and accompanying comment. The comment notes that subrogation is not permitted, so as to limit the public entities' exposure to
liability. The underlying rationale for this prohibition is based on the belief that the insurance companies are more able to withstand losses they contract for than the public
entities.
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chase, until such collateral sources are exhausted, is a violation of
the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Not only is it a taking of a
vested property interest, but it is also unduly harsh on the innocent
victim who through prudent negotiation and industry has secured
for himself a full line of collateral benefits. Often, collateral sources
are part of employee benefits taken in lieu of higher wages. It
would be an economic burden on an employee who has8 3given up

a certain wage to give up reparation of injury as well.

In considering the constitutional ramifications of the Act's rejection of the collateral source rule, an initial determination must be
made as to whether the claimant has a vested interest in that portion of
the award subject to setoff. Unlike the no-fault case, it is not clear that
84
such a vested interest exists.
In analyzing the nature of the claimant's interest in the damages
award, the judiciary would probably consider the underlying rationale
of the Act. The primary purpose is to provide an injured claimant
with redress for his present as well as his projected economic loss. 8 5
However, a secondary purpose was to prohibit the receipt of duplicate
benefits or punitive or exemplary damages which could otherwise
threaten the public treasury with excessive exposure to liability.8 6 Con83 Note, No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance: A

Constitutional Perspective, 46 ST.

JOHN'S L. REv. 104, 117 (1971).

Proponents of the collateral source rule have posited a constitutional argument against
collateral benefits setoff, regarding a no-fault motor vehicle insurance plan. See, e.g., Comment, No-Fault Automobile Insurance in New Jersey: Constitutional Problems, 3 SETON
HALL L. REv. 386, 402-03 (1972); Note, supra at 117. This position was taken by the
trial court in Belcher v. Richardson, 317 F. Supp. 1294 (S.D.W. Va. 1970), rev'd, 404 U.S.
78 (1971). The district court held that section 224 of the Social Security Act which required the diminution of social security disability awards by the amount of workmen's
compensation benefits received, to be in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
317 F. Supp. at 1295-99. The due process argument proffered by the court was that social security benefits were vested property rights which could not be setoff by collateral benefits.
Id. at 1297. This due process argument was predicated on the Supreme Court's ruling in
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970), which the Belcher court thought implicitly accorded welfare benefits the status of a vested property right. 317 F. Supp. at 1297.
The entire argument was severely undermined by the Supreme Court's recent ruling
holding that section 224 is valid, inferring a misapplication of the holding in Goldberg.
404 U.S. at 81.
84 Even assuming, arguendo, that claimant's right may be vested, such would not
necessarily preclude the governmental entity from using any part of the benefits as a setoff
against the damages award so long as the claimant receives just compensation for his injuries. See generally Grace v. Howlett, 51 111. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972); Pinnick v.
Cleary, - Mass. -, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971). The fifth amendment permits the taking of
property if such a taking comports with notions of due process encompassing justice and
fundamental fairness. Such a standard is met where there is just compensation for the
taking. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
85 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:9-5, Comment (Supp. 1973-74).
86 Id. §§ 59:9-2c, e and accompanying comment.
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sideration of the above rationale reinforces the conclusion that awards
under the Act were designed to be purely compensatory in nature;
hence, there is no vested interest in that portion of the award subject
to collateral source setoff.
In addition to the due process question, an equal protection argument may exist in the Act's treatment of collateral source benefits.
Under the Act, two classes of injured claimants are recognized: claimants not supported by collateral sources and claimants receiving collateral compensation. The net effect to an individual claimant, however, remains the same; he receives compensation only for his actual
out-of-pocket expenses, either by court award, in the absence of collateral compensation, or by a diminished award, if he obtains a partial
collateral recovery for his injuries. This approach is reasonable on its

face since it is rationally related to the purpose of the Act, i.e., compensation for the individual's out-of-pocket expenses. Therefore, it
would appear that the Act should be able to withstand an equal protec8 7
tion attack brought upon these grounds.
An alternative award procedure has been postulated which might
be acceptable to both sides of the collateral source controversy-if the
statutory scheme were amended to permit the right to indemnification
88
by the collateral source.
Broadly, it may take one of three possible forms: first, by conferring on the collateral source a right to indemnification, whether
by subrogation, assignment or an independent claim against the
tortfeasor; second, by the latter returning the benefit to his benefactor, as in the not infrequent case of conditional loans or gifts
87 To survive this constitutional test, the government need only demonstrate that the
provision is rationally related to the purpose of the Act-as long as the plan is not deemed
arbitrary or capricious. The particular equal protection test to be applied is determined,
in part, by the nature of the classification. Where the classification is considered suspect,
the state must show a compelling interest for creating it. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967). Here, however, the classification is not based upon a suspect category. Hence,
the state must show that the legislation is rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-28 (1961).
In a statutory scheme, analogous to collateral source treatment under the Act, the
constitutionality of the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Law, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 39:6-60 et seq. (1973) was upheld. Prior to its 1958 amendment, this statute allowed insurance policy benefits and settlement payments to be setoff from Fund recovery. Holmberg v.
Aten, 68 N.J. Super. 73, 81-85, 171 A.2d 667, 671-73 (App. Div. 1961); Fasano v. Gassert,
49 N.J. Super. 52, 55-56, 138 A.2d 752, 754-55 (L. Div. 1958).
88 Note, supra note 74, at 348. The Act in its current form expressly prohibits the
right of subrogation. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:9-2e (Supp. 1973-74) states in pertinent part:
No insurer or other person shall be entitled to bring an action under a subrogation provision in an insurance contract against a public entity or public employee.
See id., Comment.
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reverting to the lendor or donor; and third, in the case of otherwise continuing benefits, like periodic payments, by terminating
these as soon as tort damages assure full indemnity for the future.89

As a result of the utilization of this indemnification theory, the initial
responsibility would be placed upon the tortfeasor. This would eliminate any possibility of a double recovery by a plaintiff or partial avoidance of liability by a defendant. An additional benefit would be that
any potential reliance on the plaintiff's collateral source will be unaffected. 90 This approach appears to be a rational solution which the
legislature should consider.
Trial Without a Jury-N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:9-1
The Act provides that the tort liability of a governmental entity
or employee shall be determined by a judge sitting without a jury. 91
The decision to eliminate the judicial mechanism of trial by jury
merits analysis from a constitutional standpoint. In addition, an assessment of the utility of the jury trial under present-day theories of the
administration of justice must be considered.
The concept of trial by jury evolved from common law. 92 The
need for this judicial mechanism in civil matters, was recognized at an
early date in this country, as is evidenced by the seventh amendment
to the United States Constitution. 93 New Jersey has incorporated this
right into its own state constitution, 94 but it is guaranteed only in those
cases where it existed at common law, the common law being defined
as the time preceding this country's Declaration of Independence. 5
89 Note, supra note 74, at 348 (quoting from Fleming, The CollateralSource Rule and
Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54 CA iu. L. REv. 1478, 1484 (1966)).
90 Note, supra note 74, at 348.
91 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:9-1 (Supp. 1973-74). See also note 129 infra.
92 In the twelfth century under Henry II, the jury, consisting of twelve people, first
began to resolve factual disputes. By the thirteenth century, the jury became the normal
procedure employed in both civil and criminal actions. Augelli, Six-Member Juries in
Civil Actions in the FederalJudicial System, 3 SETON HALL L. Rav. 281, 283 (1972).
93 Specifically, the seventh amendment provides that:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according
to the rules of the common law.
U.S. CONsr. amend. VII.
94 N.J. CONsT. art. 1,
9 provides in pertinent part: "The right of trial by jury shall
"
remain inviolate ....
95 Town of Montclair v. Stanoyevich, 6 N.J. 479, 484-85, 79 A.2d 288, 290-91 (1951);
Howe v. Treasurer of Plainfield, 37 N.J.L. 145, 147 (Sup. Ct. 1874).
In Town of Montclair, the court noted that the right to a jury trial in non-petty
criminal cases was established in New Jersey even before it became a state. 6 N.J. at 490,
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Therefore, a threshold consideration of the constitutional validity
of this provision's denial of a jury trial requires a determination as to
whether the cause of action against the sovereign existed at common
law. Historically, while the king and feudal society gave way to the
nation-state, the idea of sovereign immunity survived, generally
founded on a theory that to permit a suit against the state without its
consent was not consistent with the concept of "supreme executive
power." 96 Thus, a cause of action did not lie against the state, or its
equivalent governmental form, at common law. Therefore, it would
appear that the legislature was well within its constitutional powers to
dictate the mode of trial, i.e., in this instance, the Act's provision for a
non-jury trial.
On the other hand, a different conclusion may be reached with
regard to the local governmental entity such as the municipality. Most
writers in discussing local public entity immunity cite Russell v. The
Men of Devon 97 as the first case to hold a local entity immune from
suit. However, that case pertained only to an unincorporated municipality and, as properly read, stands for the limited proposition that an
injured party cannot sue the public at large, where there is no specific
entity to sue and no fund from which to pay a damages award. 98 While
Russell was decided in 1788, and therefore too late to be controlling
in the instant analysis, it is nonetheless important, for it suggests that
the rule of law prior to 1788 might have allowed the attachment of
liability to the tortious acts of an incorporated local entity which possessed a sufficient treasury.
After extensively analyzing common law cases involving municipalities, Jones, in his treatise on municipal tort liability, 99 has affirmatively taken the position that:
An examination of the common law leaves little doubt that from
the earliest times an action on the case could be brought against
79 A.2d at 294. As for the right to a jury trial in civil actions, in Howe the court noted
that in cases cognizable in equity courts, such a right did not exist. 37 N.J.L. at 148. In
Scudder v. Trenton Delaware Falls Co., 1 N.J.Eq. 694 (Ch. 1832), the court maintained
that New Jersey's first constitution preserved the right to trial by jury in civil actions only
for "all trials of right in suits at common law." Id. at 726.
96 W. PROSSER, supra note 4 at 971.
As cogently stated by Justice Holmes in Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353
(1907):
A sovereign is exempt from suit . . .on the logical and practical ground that
there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which
the right depends.
97 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788). See W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 131, at 978.
98 See notes 3 and 4 supra and accompanying text.
99 D. JONES, NEGLIGENCE OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

(1892).
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a municipal corporation for its negligent discharge of a corporate
duty by which damage was inflicted. 100
In a more modern context, the New Jersey supreme court in Cloyes v.
Township of Delaware'0 ' stated:
The doctrine of municipal immunity originated in judicial
decisions since the separation of the Colonies from England. The
immunity is confined to those activities which the municipality
undertakes as the agent of the State as distinguished from those
which it pursues in its corporate or proprietary capacity. 102
While there is by no means a unanimous judicial consensus regarding a local incorporated entity's liability in civil actions at common
law, 10 3 the authorities quoted suggest that such liability may have existed at common law, thus mandating the legislature to reconsider the
exclusion of local incorporatedentities from the broad sweep of section

59:9-1.
Significantly, New York has provided a court of claims to hear all
actions against the state, 10 4 but has excluded local entities from its purview. Actions against local entities are, instead, within the jurisdiction
of the civil court system, where the right to jury trial is preserved. Although no express legislative authority sanctions this bifurcated
scheme, it suggests a recognition of possible constitutional infirmities
that might otherwise arise.' 0 5
Assuming for the moment that the legislature has the constitutional right to abolish the jury trial in actions against both state and
local public entities, practically speaking, it is questionable whether
100 Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
101 23 N.J. 324, 129 A.2d 1 (1957) (action for wrongful death of infant who drowned in
open sedimentations tank of defendant municipality).
102 Id. at 327, 129 A.2d at 2 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
103 See, e.g., Mower v. The Inhabitants of Leicester, 9 Mass. 247 (1812), where the
court in considering the liability of an incorporated municipality held that "it is well settled that the common law gives no such action." Id. at 249. See also Board of Chosen Freeholders v. Strader, 18 N.J.L. 108 (Sup. Ct. 1840), where the court in construing the tort
liability of the Freeholders of Sussex County, asserted that
not a solitary case is on record, of such public officer having been held liable for
damages to individuals by reason of a neglect of his public duties.
Id. at 118. However, one writer has noted that such officers were frequently held responsible for other tortious conduct. See generally Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers:
Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARv. L. Rav. 1, 9-16 (1963).
104 N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 9; N.Y. PUB. AuT-i. LAw §§ 163-a, 212-a, 358.2, 469-a, 1607
(McKinney 1970). See generally McNamara, The Court of Claims: Its Development and
Present Role in the Unified Court System, 40 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 1 (1965).
105 Conversation with Saul L. Cohen, Assistant Corporation Counsel, Law Department, Tort Division, City of New York, Dec. 14, 1973.
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such a policy benefits the judicial process. Therefore an inquiry into
the merits of discarding the jury mechanism by New Jersey's Act is
appropriate.
From its genesis at early common law, to the present, the effectiveness of the jury system has increasingly become the focal point of much
criticism. 0 6 The most frequently expressed objections to the jury trial
are: (a) that it is an important cause of court delay and calendar congestion due to its "inherent slowness;" (b) that it results in high administration costs; and (c) that the jury is ineffective as a fact-finder,
dispensing non-uniform awards on the basis of emotional as opposed to
logical considerations. 10 7
The Attorney General's Task Force Report, in adopting this position recommended, 108 and the legislature ultimately accepted, the nonjury trial approach in ascertaining sovereign liability. Yet, there have
been many writers who strongly defend the jury system.'" One proponent of the jury system explains that the cause of calendar congestion may be rooted in the failure to provide enough juries rather than
the jury system itself. 110 With respect to the fact-finding ability of
juries, the University of Chicago Jury Project points out that in some
4,000 cases studied, the jury verdict agreed with the opinion of the presiding judge nearly 80 per cent of the time."1 Furthermore, it has been
106 See generally Augelli, supra note 92; Corbin, The Jury On Trial, 14 A.B.A.J. 507
(1928); Duane, Civil Jury Should be Abolished, 12 J. AM. Jua. Soc'y 137 (1929); Peck, Do
Juries Delay Justice?, 18 F.R.D. 455 (1956).
107 Augelli, supra note 92, at 287-88.
With regard to the first objection, it is recognized that serious problems exist in the
facile disposition of criminal and civil cases in our courts. Although no direct data has
been obtained comparing the time differential between cases tried before a judge and
those tried before a jury, it has been asserted that a 40 per cent time differential in favor
of non-jury trials exists in connection with personal injury cases. It is also maintained
that the time spent on voir dire, opening statements, closing arguments and attorney rhetoric designed to impress the jury, adds to the lethargic pace of the jury trials. Id. at 288.
As evidence of the high cost factor of a jury trial, critics point to the per diem and
mileage payments to the juror, the subsistence allowance if the juror cannot return home
during the trial, and the salaries of court personnel required "in connection with the
handling of the jury." It is further argued that lack of knowledge of the law on the part
of the juror, as well as inexperience, constitute inherent deficiencies in the jury mechanism which can best be cured by abolishing the system. Id. at 287-88.
108 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 12, at 15.
109 Botter, Jury Bias in Hudson and Bergen Counties: A View from the Bench, 4 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1, 14 (1972).
110 McKenzie, What Is Truth? A Defense of the Jury System, 44 A.B.A.J. 51, 52 (1958).
This rationale suggests an awareness that the "congestion is corrected not by curtailment
of the rights of the people, but by expansion of the court system." Comment, supra note
83, at 407.
111 H. KALVEN & H. ZEIsEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 63-64 (1966).
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asserted that the rate of appeal from non-jury chancery decisions is
substantially the same as that from jury trials, suggesting that judges
are no less prone to error than juries." 2
The high damage awards in tort actions have been rationalized in
the context of escalating medical expenses and the cost of living.118
In the Chicago Study, jury awards were compared with the presiding
judge's separate and advance estimate of the award. The study indicates that such awards are generally consistent, predictable and generally in line with the judge's estimate where the defendant was an
individual.

11 4

As to the question of the cost of administering a jury system, one
writer has contrasted a state workmen's compensation system which
provides for hearings by arbitration, the use of impartial experts to fix
the nature and extent of injury and a fixed schedule of benefits, with
the Federal Employers' Liability Act (F.E.L.A.) provision for liability
and damages determination through the regular jury trial mechanism.
Surprisingly, this comparison indicated that the cost of running the
workmen's compensation program was greater than the corresponding
F.E.L.A. costs." 15
It is generally agreed that the role of the jury is fact-finding in nature. The jury's function in tort actions is to resolve conflicting questions of fact by evaluation of conduct pursuant to the "reasonable
man" standard. This task is particularly well suited to the layman,
who brings with him the community standards and values necessary
for this determination.'" 6 Thus, the jury apparatus operates upon the
premise that one need not be a lawyer to understand guiding principles and to make factual judgments in light of them. To eliminate this
system would be to destroy the very foundation of our civil jurispru7
dential system."
Against this backdrop of uncertainty regarding the place of the
jury in civil trials, criticism of the legislature's decision to exclude
juries from determining public entity or employee liability would appear even more justified in multi-party actions where a public entity
or employee is sued as a co-defendant with one or more private parties.
In such a situation, where a private party defendant has demanded his
112

McKenzie, supra note 110, at 52.

113

Id. at 53.

114 Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REv.

115 McKenzie, supra note 110, at 54.
116 See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 289-90.
117 Cf. Botter, supra note 109, at 14.

1055, 1065 (1964).
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constitutional right to a jury trial,118 the rationalization for excluding
the jury from determining public entity or employee liability is indefensible. The resulting bifurcation of liability between judge, in the
case of the state, and jury, in the case of a private party defendant, x19
could result in a costly, inefficient, inconsistent, and duplicative decision-making procedure. These consequences would defeat the very
120
purposes relied upon by the legislature to dispense with the jury trial.
Individuals from both the bar and the bench, recognizing this difficulty, have suggested that in multi-party actions where a demand for a
jury trial has been made, all aspects of the case should be tried before
a jury, with the court treating the jury's verdict, vis-ei-vis the governmental body, as advisory. The judge could then either accept the ver121
dict or if found to be unreasonable, reject it.
It should be pointed out that the California legislature decided
that questions of governmental tort liability should be tried before a
jury whose verdict is definitive rather than advisory. 1 22 Some ten years
have passed since the California Tort Claims Act was enacted, and
none of the difficulties supposedly associated with a jury trial have materialized.12 With respect to the provision of a jury trial, therefore, it
would appear, at least upon a cursory examination, to be an appropriate model upon which to base our own Act. New Jersey's legislature,
however, rejected the California approach and instead followed the nonjury format adopted by the federal government.
The Federal Tort Claims Act 12 4 provides for a hearing of all claims
against the United States by the district court sitting without a jury. 125
However, in Poston v. United States,12 6 the non-jury provision was
interpreted not to exclude the use of an advisory jury in determining
the liability of the United States in cases where a jury was already
present to hear issues relating to the liability of private party defend118 N.J. CONST. art. 1, 9.
119 This procedure is necessitated by a clash between the right of the private party
defendant and the defendant-sovereign's guarantee of a non-jury trial.
120 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 12, at 15.
121 See Judge Morgan's comment on this bifurcation procedure in the written text of
the Cherry Hill Review Meeting, supra note 3.
122 While there is no provision in California's Tort Claims Act that specifically grants
a claimant the right to a jury trial, CAL. Gov'T CODE § 945.2 (West 1966) implies such a
right in providing: "Except as otherwise provided by law, the rules of practice in civil actions apply to actions brought against public entities."
123 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 12, at 131.
124 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq. (1970).
125 Id. §§ 1346(b), 2402.
126 262 F. Supp. 22 (D. Hawaii 1966), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 946 (1968).
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ants. 127 The Court cautioned, however, that it "would be reluctant to
use an advisory jury . . . if a trial jury were not already trying the
' x28
case as to other defendants.'
Although the Federal Tort Claims Act is without an express provision for an advisory jury, the statute was judicially construed in Poston,
by way of reference to the federal rules of civil procedure, to permit
such a device in multi-defendant litigation. Since New Jersey's legislature has adopted the approach favored in the federal act, the state's
judiciary could make the same analogy to its own rules of procedure,
29
which also permit advisory juries in similar situations.1
Time for Presentation of Claims-N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 59:8-8, -9
A claimant must notify a public entity of his claim for damages
or injury within 90 days of the accrual of the cause of action. 3 0 If
notice is not given within the 90 day period, then the claimant must,
within one year of the accrual of the action, apply to the superior
court upon motion for leave to file a late claim. Such motion will not
be granted unless sufficient reasons for the tardiness are provided to the
court, along with a showing that there has been no substantial prejudice to the public entity as a result of the late notice. The court is
given the further discretion to extend the late filing period up to a full
two years from the time of the accrual of the claim. If the motion is
denied, the claimant is effectively barred from instituting further
action.' 3 '
127 262 F. Supp. at 24.
128 Id.
129 Compare N.J.R. 4:35-2, which provides:

The court on motion or its own initiative may try with an advisory jury, any
issue not triable of right by a jury, or it may, with the consent of all parties appearing at the trial, order a trial of any such issue with a jury whose verdict has
the same effect as if trial by jury had been a matter of right.
with FEn. R. Civ. P. 39(c), which states:
In all actions not triable of right by a jury the court upon motion or of its
own initiative may try any issue with an advisory jury or, except in actions against
the United States when a statute of the United States provides for trial without a
jury, the court, with the consent of both parties, may order a trial with a jury
whose verdict has the same effect as if trial by jury had been a matter of right.
In addition to the possibility of having an advisory jury, the Act also provides that
where comparative negligence is in issue, a jury may be employed to return a two-fold
verdict. The first part is limited to damages "incurred by each party irrespective of his
negligence." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:9-4b(1). The second part of the verdict considers the percentage of negligence of each party which is fractionally calculated against the total damage award. The appropriate judgment is then entered. Id. § 59:9-4b(2).
130 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:8-8 (Supp. 1973-74). This section provides for a settlement
period of six months from the date of presentation of the claim, and if there is no settlement, then the claimant may file a suit in an appropriate court,
131 Id. § 59:8-9. The only case to date construing these provisions is Lutz v. Semcer,
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Due to the enactment of sections 59:8-8 and 59:8-9, New Jersey
now has two statutes of limitations for tort actions-one of 90 days
pertaining to an action brought against a public entity or employee, 132
and another of two years applying exclusively to private parties. 133 This
dichotomy appears to raise an equal protection question which has
already been resolved in several jurisdictions. An examination of the
resolution of this question in the jurisdictions which have been confronted with the problem reveals its complex nature.
Michigan's sovereign immunity statute, which had provided for a
60-day notice requirement, 13 4 was invalidated by that state's highest
court in Reich v. State Highway Department 35 as being violative of
the equal protection guarantees of the United States and Michigan
Constitutions.3 8 The court asserted that such a notice requirement
arbitrarily split the natural class, i.e., all tortfeasors, into two differently treated subclasses: private tortfeasors to whom no notice
of claim is owed and governmental tortfeasors to whom notice is
owed.
• . . [T]he notice requirement acts as a special statute of
limitations which arbitrarily bars the actions of the victims of governmental negligence .

. .

. Such arbitrary treatment clearly vio-

lates the equal protection guarantees of our state and Federal
Constitutions.17
126 N.J. Super. 288, 314 A.2d 86 (L Div. 1974), where the court strictly applied section
59:8-8's 90-day notice requirement. The court found that "[m]ere ignorance of the law is
not a sufficient basis to excuse compliance with the requirements of this remedial statute."
Id. at 297, 314 A.2d at 91. The court maintained that plaintiff's inability to ascertain
the full extent of his injuries would not toll the running of the notice requirement. Thus,
a claim must be asserted within ninety days after the liability-engendering conduct regardless of when all internal injuries can be diagnosed. Id. at 298, 314 A.2d at 92.
Yet the plaintiff was not completely barred from asserting his claim due to a possible
oversight of the drafters of the Act. The plaintiff maintained that the late claims provision
applied only to public entities and not public employees, and thus, his claim against the
defendant police officers was not precluded. The court agreed with plaintiff, noting that
section 59:8-8 makes reference only to public entities and not employees. Thus, plaintiff's
failure to file within the ninety-day limit as set out in section 59:8-8 only barred his claim
against the town and not against its police officers. Id. at 300, 314 A.2d at 93. The omission
of public employees from section 59:8-8 appears to be an oversight on the part of the
drafters since N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:10-1 (Supp. 1973-74) provides specifically for indemnification of public employees by the appropriate public entity.
132 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:8-8a (Supp. 1973-74).
188 Id. § 2A:14-2 (1952).
134 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1404 (1968), as amended, MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN.
§ 691.1404 (Supp. 1973-74).
135 386 Mich. 617, 194 N.W.2d 700 (1972).
136 Id. at 623-24, 194 N.W.2d at 702.
'37 Id.
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It should be emphasized that Michigan's statute did not provide a late
claim procedure, while New Jersey's Act clearly embodies such a provision.
In Turner v. Staggs,138 a recent decision by the Nevada supreme
court, the claimant's suit was dismissed by the trial court for failure to
present the sovereign with notice within six months of the accrual of
the cause of action 139 as mandated by Nevada's County Government
Act. 140 The supreme court reversed, maintaining that to enforce this
statute of limitations would preclude the claimants "from enforcing a
liability created by statute for their benefit. ' ' 141 Turner relied heavily on
Reich for its reasoning, finding that the express purpose of the Act was
to accord equal status to the plaintiff in suits against both private and
public defendants. 1 Since New Jersey's Tort Claims Act was not intended to eliminate all distinctions between the two classes of claimants, 143 the reasoning utilized by the Turner court could not be employed in a constitutional attack on sections 59:8-8 and 59:8-9.
44
The Illinois supreme court, in Housewright v. City of LaHarpe,
refused to find a constitutional infirmity in that state's tort claims act, 1 45
asserting by way of dictum that its six month notice requirement did
not violate either the equal protection or due process clauses of the
fourteenth amendment. 146 In recognizing that " '[t]he question of this
notice is entirely within legislative control,' -147 the Housewright court
138 - Nev. -, 510 P.2d 879 (1973).
139 Plaintiff did not file notice of claim until thirteen months after accrual of the

action. Id. at -, 510 P.2d at 881.
140 N'v. REv. STAT. § 244.250 (1971) provides in pertinent part:
1. All unaudited claims or accounts against any county shall be presented to
the board of county commissioners within 6 months from the time such claims or
accounts become due or payable.
2. No claim or account against any county shall be audited, allowed or paid
unless the provisions of subsection 1 are strictly complied with.
Nev. at -, 510 P.2d at 882. The court further stated that such a dismissal
141 amounted to an "invidious discrimination." Id.
510 P.2d at 882. The court also found the statute to be violative of state
142 Id. at -,
equal protection guarantees. Id. at -, 510 P.2d at 883. See NEv. CONsr. art. I § 2.
143 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-la (Supp. 1973-74) and accompanying comment.
144 51 I1. 2d 357, 282 N.E.2d 437 (1972).
145 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, § 8-102 (Smith-Hurd 1966), as amended, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
85, § 8-102 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973-74).
146 51 111. 2d at 361, 282 N.E.2d at 440.
147 Id. at 364, 282 N.E.2d at 441 (quoting from Ouimette v. City of Chicago, 242 Il.
501, 507, 90 N.E. 300, 302 (1909)). In accord with Housewright is the dissenting opinion
of Chief Justice Thompson in Turner. Chief Justice Thompson argued that equal protection did not mandate equal treatment of the two classes of claimants. - Nev. at -, 510
P.2d at 886 (Thompson, C.J., dissenting). This opinion might well have been based on
Justice Frankfurter's famous statement that:
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concluded that failure to provide proper notice in a suit brought under
the act would properly result in its final dismissal. 14
An earlier version of California's Tort Claims Act contained a late
claims provision 149 substantially similar to sections 59:8-8 and 59:8-9
of the New Jersey Act. In Tammen v. County of San Diego,150 the California supreme court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a claimant the right to file a late claim. 151 The court,
in rejecting claimant's due process and equal protection arguments, 152
relied on its earlier holding in Dias v. Eden Township Hospital District, 5 3 in which it maintained that "'[p]ublic agencies, generally
speaking, afford a proper subject for legislative classification.'-154
Review of these decisions would appear to indicate that New Jersey's notice sections are constitutional in light of the Act's late claim
provision and the legislature's inherent right to classify. It should be
stressed, however, that the legislature's right to classify is not absolute,
but is always subject to the "rational basis" test. 155 The Act's notice
provisions, though providing a more restrictive approach to the filing
of claims than in an ordinary civil action, would probably encounter
little difficulty in passing a constitutional challenge since its provisions
are rationally related to its underlying purposes. These objectives are:
(a) to provide for prompt notification of claims with a view to arrange
for investigation, locating witnesses, preserving evidence and the like;
(b) to process claims administratively, thereby avoiding overburdening
Classification is inherent in legislation; the Equal Protection Clause has not forbidden it.
Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 472 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
148 51 Ill.
2d at 365, 282 N.E.2d at 442. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, § 8-103 (SmithHurd 1966).
149 Cal. Tort Claims Act § 912(b), ch. 1715, § 1, 1963 Stats. 3372 (1963), as amended,
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 946.6 (West Supp. 1973) provided that the superior court grant leave
to file a late claim if the court found that the notice to the state board was made within
a reasonable period not exceeding one year after the accrual of the cause of action and
that:
(1) The failure to present the claim was through mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect unless the public entity . . . establishes that it would be
prejudiced if leave to present the claim were granted ....
150 66 Cal. 2d 468, 426 P.2d 753, 58 Cal. Rptr. 249 (1967).
151 Id. at 474, 426 P.2d at 757, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 253.
152 Id. at 481, 426 P.2d at 761, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 257.
153 57 Cal. 2d 502, 370 P.2d 334, 20 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1962).
154 66 Cal. 2d at 481, 426 P.2d at 761, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 257 (quoting from 57 Cal. 2d
at 504, 370 P.2d at 335, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 631).
155 See Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911), in which the
Supreme Court listed the criteria for testing a discriminatory classification.
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the courts; and (c) to screen out claims that are specifically excluded by
the Act. 156
Another question raised by the notice section concerns the provi1 57
sion for filing a late claim at the discretion of the superior court.
This procedure necessitates the preparation of a suitable motion and
the presentation of the same before the court. Such a motion could
necessitate the appearance of the appropriate governmental entity before the court if that entity alleged that substantial prejudice would
result if the late claim were permitted to be filed. This requirement
appears to be contrary to one of the underlying rationales of the Actto prevent undue court calendar congestion while providing prompt
redress to private individuals for injuries suffered as a consequence of
the tortious acts of the sovereign. 158 As presently structured, this provision could increase the already crowded court calendar.
The California approach appears to afford a reasonable solution
for increasing administrative efficiency. Pursuant to this scheme, a
claimant wishing to bring an action against the local public entity is
initially permitted to file a late claim application with the 'public
entity itself, which then may or may not consider the claim. 1 9 Only
after the public entity has rejected claimant's application to present
a late claim must the late claimant seek the aid of the courts160 This
procedure, if adopted in New Jersey, would in many cases permit a
prompt and efficient resolution of a late claim question without vitiating the objectives of the Act.
Plan or Design Immunity-N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:4-6
The Act is intended to grant complete immunity to a public entity or a public employee for injuries flowing from a plan or design of
an original construction of, or improvement to, public property. Such
plan or design must have been given either prior official approval by an
authorized body such as the legislature, a local governing body, or a
public employee exercising discretionary authority, or it must have been
156 Conversations with New Jersey Deputy Attorney General John Fitzpatrick, Chief of
Tort and Contract Unit of Claims Section, Dec. 11, 1973. Claims specifically excluded in
the Act are found in N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 59:4-5 to 4-9 (Supp. 1973-74).
157 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:8-9 (Supp. 1973-74).
158 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 12, at 15.
159 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 915(a) (West 1966).
160 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 946.6 (West 1966) and accompanying comment. Section 946.6
appears to apply only in actions against local public entities, while an application for
leave to file a late claim against the state must be presented first to the State Board of
Control and not directly to the state. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 915(b) (West 1966).
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prepared in conformity with standards previously approved. 10 ' According to the official comment to this section, this immunity was premised
on the theory that approval of a plan or design constitutes a discretionary function of government that cannot be subject to the threat of civil
liability.162
Despite the clear language in this provision, explanation of its
operation in the accompanying comment reveals certain ambiguities as
to the actual breadth of the intended scope of immunity. The comment
states that the immunity is "similar" to that recognized in Weiss v.
Fote'6 3 by the New York court of appeals. The standard adopted in
Weiss provides that immunity will attach to a plan or design, unless
"due care was not exercised in the preparation of the design or . . . no
reasonable official could have adopted it."' 164 New Jersey's section
59:4-6, however, makes no reference to reasonableness or due care of
the official as a requirement for establishing immunity for a plan or
design. 165
This potential conflict between section 59:4-6 and its accompanying comment might allow the judiciary to read a reasonableness prerequisite into the provision. Such a construction would serve to ameliorate the often harsh results generated when sovereign immunity attaches. 166 Since the courts will probably first consider prior New Jersey
case law in determining whether a reasonableness standard is implicit
in the provision, 167 an examination of these decisions may indicate the
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:4-6 (Supp. 1973-74) states:
a. Neither the public entity nor a public employee is liable under this chapter
for an injury caused by the plan or design of public property, either in its original
construction or any improvement thereto, where such plan or design has been approved in advance of the construction or improvement by the Legislature or the
governing body of a public entity or some other body or a public employee exercising discretionary authority to give such approval or where such plan or design
is prepared in conformity with standards previously so approved.
162 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:4-6, Comment (Supp. 1973-74).
163 7 N.Y.2d 579, 167 N.E.2d 63, 200 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1960).
164 Id. at 586, 167 N.E.2d at 66, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 413.
165 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:4-6 (Supp. 1973-74). For the text of this statute, see note 161
supra.
166 Chief Justice Weintraub, writing in Willis v. Department of Conserv. & Econ. Dev.,
55 N.J. 534, 264 A.2d 34 (1970), commented on the inequitable result of providing for complete immunity. "It is plainly unjust to refuse relief to persons injured by the wrongful
conduct of the State." Id. at 537, 264 A.2d at 36. See also Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort
Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 919, 921.
167 In Barney's Furniture Warehouse v. City of Newark, 62 N.J. 456, 303 A.2d 76
(1973), it was recently noted that the Tort Claims Act, for the most part, is a codification
of the prior case law. This statement was made in the context of an assault on a municipality's plan or design immunity on the basis of case law antedating adoption of the Act. Id.
at 470 n.4, 303 A.2d at 83.
.161
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possibility of the judiciary supplementing the express language of section 59:4-6.
The accompanying comment to this section cites two New Jersey
cases, Fitzgerald v. Palmerl 5 and Hughes v. County of Burlington,69
for the general principle that the approval of plans or designs is purely
a discretionary function of the sovereign, whose judgment should not
be subjected to tort liability.170 These two cases at first blush appear
only to add to the confusion. While Hughes supports the position of
complete immunity granted in section 59:4-6, Fitzgerald proposes a
reasonableness standard in some measure similar to that adopted by
New York in the Weiss decision.
In Fitzgerald, a concrete slab that killed plaintiff's decedent was
dropped by an unknown person from an overhead crossing constructed
by the state highway department. 171 Plaintiff argued that the accident
could have been prevented by construction of a wire fence on the
overpass. 172 The court rejected the plaintiff's claim upon the state's
assertion of sovereign immunity. However, by way of dictum, the court
stated that if the sovereign did act "in a manner short of ordinary pru173
dence," then the government could indeed be subjected to liability.
Such a standard of "ordinary prudence" might be applied against
the government if a road were "constructed of a design imperiling the
user."' 174 The Fitzgerald court, however, felt constrained not to extend
this standard to a governmental act manifesting an exercise of discretion. Moreover, those matters the court referred to as involving discretion are typical of those actions sought to be granted continued immunity from liability under the Act. 7 5 Thus, the area of governmental
168 47 N.J. 106, 219 A.2d 512 (1966).
169 99 N.J. Super. 405, 240 A.2d 177 (App. Div. 1968).
170 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:4-6, Comment (Supp. 1973-74).
171 47 N.J. at 107, 219 A.2d at 513.
172 Id. at 108, 219 A.2d at 515.
178 Id. at 109, 219 A.2d at 514. This was merely dictum, since the assertion of sovereign immunity resulted in the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of
action.
174 Id.

175 The court in Fitzgerald noted that certain governmental decisions as to allocation
of revenue, are wholly within the discretion of the legislative and executive branches and
are thus immune from the bench's second-guessing. These decisions include
whether a road should have four or six or eight lanes, or there should be dividers,
or circles or jughandles for turns, or traffic lights, or traffic policemen, or a speed
limit of 50 or 60 miles per hour ....

Id. at 109-10, 219 A.2d at 514. Compare with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-3c (Supp. 1973-74),
which provides that the public entity will not be liable for its discretion in deciding
whether to seek or furnish resources necessary for maintenance or construction of facilities,
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action that Fitzgerald sought to subject to judicial review against a
standard of ordinary prudence will be limited to those actions of a
176
ministerial nature, as is recognized by the Act.
Extension of the "ordinary prudence" standard into the area of
discretionary action was rejected by the Hughes court when confronted
with a claim that plaintiff's injury resulted from the county's failure
17
to construct conventional road shoulders when it designed a highway."
The court found no merit in plaintiff's contention that the governmental action was within the ambit of scrutiny under Fitzgerald's
ordinary prudence standard. Instead, it concluded that the exercise of
governmental authority in the instant case was one of considered judgment and discretion which the Fitzgerald court had recognized as
beyond the scope of judicial review. 178
The Act provides complete immunity for a public entity's discretion when it decides how to utilize or apply available resources in the
face of competing demands, unless such a governmental decision can
be deemed "palpably unreasonable."'179 Thus, certain discretionary decisions now can be subjected to a limited judicial review. s0 Whether
a policy decision can be subjected to judicial review under the Act
probably will turn on what level that policy was conceived. 81
If the courts continue to follow the trend of limiting sovereign
immunity8 2 as it had been developing before the Tort Claims Act was
purchase of equipment, hiring of personnel, and the general supply of sufficient governmental services. The accompanying comment clearly states that this section immunizes
"high-level policy decisions" from tort liability. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-3c, Comment (Supp.
1973-74).
176 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-3d states in pertinent part:
Nothing in this section shall exonerate a public entity for negligence arising
out of acts or omissions of its employees in carrying out their ministerial functions.
See acompanying comment.
177 99 N.J. Super. at 414, 240 A.2d at 181-82.
178 Id. at 414, 240 A.2d at 181.
179 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-3d (Supp. 1973-74).
180 Id.
181 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-3d, Comment (Supp. 1973-74). The comment alludes to
Bergen v. Koppenal, 52 N.J. 478, 246 A.2d 442 (1968) for support. In Koppenal, the question was whether a town was obligated to take over traffic control when its police had
learned that an overhead traffic light had broken loose. The court decided that a town's
determination of how to deploy its police in light of competing demands would not subject the public entity to liability unless such a determination was found to be "palpably
unreasonable." Id. at 480, 246 A.2d at 444. The court narrowed its holding by stating that
a high-level policy decision as distinguished from a lower-level one would continue to
be exempt from judicial review. Id. As previously stated in note 175 supra, high-level
policy decisions are still afforded complete immunity under the Act.
182 See Willis v. Department of Conserv. & Econ. Dev., 55 N.J. 534, 264 A.2d 34 (1970),
which abolished the doctrine of sovereign immunity for all governmental acts except those
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adopted, it appears likely that immunity will be determined on the
basis of the discretionary-ministerial dichotomy. 8 3 In addition to Fitz-

gerald and Hughes, movement toward this view was recently evidenced
in Catto v. Schnepp.114 There, an appellate court held that the township's design and reconstruction of a road was a manifestation of its
1 5
discretionary judgment, and thus not subject to judicial review. 1
Section 59:4-6 sanctions the continued application of the ministerialdiscretionary dichotomy, in mandating immunity from liability for
actions of the latter variety.18 6
18 7
However, the legislature's recognition of this nebulous standard
appears likely to become an exercise in futility when applied by the
judiciary. A simpler approach that would better serve the function of
mitigating the severity of absolute plan or design immunity would be
for the courts to construe section 59:4-6 in .light of New York's Weiss
reasonableness standard.18 8 One writer has suggested that

the New Jersey courts would be well within the permissible bounds
of statutory construction in adopting the reasonableness standard
expressed in Weiss; that is, liability for injury resulting from the
plan or design of public property may be predicated on proof that
the plan or design was either evolved without adequate study or
9
lacked reasonable basis. l8
"calling for the exercise of official judgment or discretion." Id. at 540, 264 A.2d at 37.
Chief Justice Weintraub noted the "steady movement away from immunity." Id. at 538,
264 A.2d at 36.
183 See notes 36-40 supra and accompanying text for an extended discussion of the
ministerial-discretionary dichotomy.
184 121 N.J. Super. 506, 298 A.2d 74 (App. Div. 1972).
185 Id. at 510, 298 A.2d at 76.
18 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:4-6 (Supp. 1973-74), and accompanying comment. See also N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 59:2-3d (Supp. 1973-74).
187 For a useful discussion of the overlapping between the ministerial-discretionary
functions, see Note, Discretionary Immunity Doctrine in California, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 561,
568 (1968). The New Jersey Tort Claims Act only gives by way of example what activities
are deemed discretionary. See notes 54-59 supra and accompanying text.
188 See text accompanying note 164 supra. Such an interpretation could be premised
on the official comment's recognition that "[this immunity is similar to the immunity
provided by . . . [Weiss] and by leglislation in the State of California." N.J. STAT. ANN.

§ 59:4-6, Comment (Supp. 1973-74). The California statute alluded to by the comment is
very similar to section 59:4-6 except that immunity will attach only if
(a) a reasonable public employee could have adopted the plan or design . . . or
(b) a reasonable legislative body or other body or employee could have approved
the plan or design ....
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 830.6 (West 1966) (emphasis added).
Significantly, both require that the sovereign demonstrate that the design or plan was
evolved on some reasonable basis before immunity can attach. See text accompanying note
164 supra for the Weiss standard.
189 Note, The New Jersey Tort Claims Act, Section 59:4-6-Public Property Plan or
Design Immunity, 26 RuTGRS L. REv. 838, 851 (1973) (footnote omitted).
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While the bench may have a role in determining the parameters
of a reasonableness standard as it relates to plan or design immunity,
only the legislature is in a position to reconsider whether immunity
should be perpetual, even when changing conditions make the plan
or design dangerous. While section 59:4-6 specifically omits mention
of perpetuation, 9 0 the official comment expressly states that plan or
design immunity is to be perpetual despite any change of conditions
which would render the existing plan or design dangerous to the public.1 9' Therefore, once the immunity attaches, it will be of a permanent
nature unless the legislature reconsiders its position in light of one of
the approaches adopted by California or New York.
The comment rejected the California approach as articulated in
Baldwin v. State,192 which held that a design or plan originally approved
as being safe did not enjoy perpetual immunity when the actual operation of the plan or design became dangerous under changed physical
conditions. 93 Yet the comment did not discuss the more temperate
position espoused in New York by way of dictum in Weiss. The New
York court of appeals stated that a public entity is under a continuing
duty to review its plan or design of public property, and where, because
of changed circumstances a dangerous condition exists which is the
proximate cause of the injury, then the entity will be liable. 94 Yet,
unlike California, the entity will only be subject to liability if its response or failure to respond to the changed condition "was evolved
without adequate study or lacked reasonable basis."' 195
Another device which could be utilized by the courts in avoiding
the harshness of plan or design immunity would involve construing the
response by the public entity or the failure to respond to a subsequent
dangerous condition as a breach of a ministerial duty which, under the
Act, is clearly liability-engendering. 196 As such, there would be no need
to consider the danger of judicial intrusion into the legislature's or
190 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:4-6 (Supp. 1975-74). For text of this statute, see note 161
supra.
191 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:4-6, Comment (Supp. 1973-74).
192 6 Cal. 3d 424, 491 P.2d 1121, 99 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1972). The comment expressly dismissed California's view
as unrealistic and inconsistent with the thesis of discretionary immunity-that a
coordinate branch of government should not be second-guessed by the judiciary
for high level policy decisions.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:4-6, Comment (Supp. 1973-74).
193 6 Cal. 3d at 429-30, 491 P.2d at 1123, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 147.
194 7 N.Y.2d at 588, 167 N.E.2d at 67-68, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 415.
195 Id. at 589, 167 N.E.2d at 68, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 416.
196 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:3-2d states in pertinent part: "Nothing in this section shall
exonerate a public employee for negligence arising out of his acts or omissions in carry
[sic] out his ministerial functions."
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executive's domain, since notice of a dangerous condition would call
for immediate corrective action (ministerial), rather than a balancing
of fiscal priorities (discretionary). The fear expressed by the legislature,
of possible intrusion into the planning functions of the public entity,
would then be unwarranted.
This analysis may be nothing more than semantic legerdemain,
for in many instances the distinction between discretionary and ministerial functions is more form than substance.19 7 Rather than relying on
the vagaries of judicial interpretation, it is hoped that the legislature
will take positive action to amend the provision to conform with the
more equitable approach adopted in New York. A public entity should
not be permitted "ostrich-like, [to] hide its head in the blueprints,
blithely ignoring the actual operation of the plan."'l s
Damages for Pain and Suffering-N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:9-2d
One provision of the Act, which has been the subject of strong
attack on the part of the trial lawyers' segment of the bar, relates to the
threshold provision concerning recovery of damages for pain and suffering. The Act necessitates a showing by the plaintiff of both medical
treatment expenses in excess of $1,000 and permanent loss of a bodily
function or permanent disfigurement or dismemberment, as a precondition to recovery of damages for pain and suffering. 199
This provision is grounded on the strong public policy that damages for pain and suffering should be granted only when the loss is
200
substantial, due to the public entities' existing "economic burdens."
The validity of this public policy rationale was questioned by the
Middlesex County Trial Lawyers Association, which condemned the
provision as "so overly protective against imagined abuses [relating to
so-called nuisance claims] by the few that it emasculates the rights of
many with legitimate claims."' 20 1 This provision represents a regressive
recovery -formulation which is inconsistent with the original purposes
of the Act of correcting inherently unfair and inequitable results
which occur in the strict application of the traditional doctrine of sovereign immunity.2 2 By requiring both an excessive dollar threshold
See notes 33-36 supra and accompanying text.
6 Cal. 3d at 434, 491 P.2d at 1127, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 151.
199 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:9-2d (Supp. 1973-74).
200 Id. § 59:9-2d, Comment.
201 Letter from Middlesex County Trial Lawyers Association to Editor, May 17, 1973,
in 96 N.J.L.J. 605, 620 (1973).
202 Id. at 605.
197
198
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and permanent injury, the provision fails to properly compensate an
2 03

otherwise deserving plaintiff.

Proposed solutions to the problem have ranged from removing the
threshold and permanent injury requirements, on the rationale that
they arbitrarily deprive a claimant of a right to a remedy, to an approach similar to that adopted by the legislature in the automobile
no-fault legislation. If the latter approach were adopted, recovery of
damages for pain and suffering would be permitted where: (1) the
value of medical expenses is greater than $200 and the injuries solely
confined to the soft tissue; (2) a permanent injury is incurred by the
plaintiff or; (3) the injury is other than a permanent injury and is not
confined to the soft tissue, e.g., broken bones, etc. 204 Under this approach, the monetary threshold would only be determinative in the
context of soft tissue injury. 20 In the event that any excessive recovery
is awarded, the state has the option to protect its treasury by purchasing
2 06
catastrophe or risk insurance.
Attorneys' Fees-N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:9-5
Reasonable attorneys' fees may be awarded a successful claimant,
at the discretion of the court, where there is no recovery for pain and
suffering. On the other hand, a claimant who recovers for pain and
20 7
suffering will not be awarded such fees.
A constitutional difficulty arises under this provision since pursuant to the court rules, R. 4:42-9,208 the awarding of attorneys' fees is
permitted only under certain circumstances, apparently not encom203 Consider, for example, the injured party who suffers only a soft tissue injury
which, however, is extremely painful and disabling and treatment of which entails medical
expenses over $1000-yet there is no recovery for pain and suffering. Id. at 620.
204 Id. See New Jersey Automobile Reparations Reform Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-1
et seq. (Supp. 1973-74).
205 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-8 (Supp. 1973-74).
208 See M. Lenz, Jr., RISK MANAGEMENT MANUAL § 3, at 19 (1973) and J. Duff, FisE
CASUALTY & SURETY BULLErsNS, Pf-1 (Dec. 3, 1973), for a good discussion of how catastrophe
or risk insurance can insulate public entities from excessive liability.
In fact, the state has provided an extensive program of insurance to cover liability
exposures. The present catastrophe limit is $5,000,000 per occurrence/$10,000,000 aggregate,
subject to $500,000 deductible, excluding only medical malpractice at the New Jersey Medical College (separately insured at $3,000,000 limit) and aircraft (separately insured at
$5,000,000 limit). In addition, an extensive underlying program of insurance covering the
$500,000 deductible provides for automobile liability, comprehensive general liability,
medical malpractice at state institutions and lawyers' professional liability. Information
furnished by the State of New Jersey Department of Insurance, February 13, 1974.
207 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:9-5 (Supp. 1973-74).
208 N.J.R. 4:42-9.
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passing the present situation under the Act. Furthermore, the case law
in New Jersey has consistently viewed the question of attorneys' fees
as a matter of procedure, subject only to regulation and control by
the judiciary and not amenable to legislative review. 209 As such, section
59:9-5 of the Tort Claims Act may be deemed as an unauthorized incursion upon the rule-making powers of the judiciary and, hence, invalid and unenforceable.
CONCLUSION

Analysis of New Jersey's Tort Claims Act discloses problem areas
in several of the Act's procedural and administrative provisions. Possible constitutional infirmities inherent in the Act's structure could
render key sections inoperative. In addressing themselves to these difficulties, both the legislature and the judiciary must undertake the
necessary tasks of revision and interpretation. The Act's underlying
policy considerations should serve as the proper guidance for these
bodies during the ensuing reformation process.
By its very nature, interpretation of the Act requires an appreciation of its important separation of powers implications. At the heart of
this problem is the recbgnition that the legislative hold on the state's
purse strings cannot be controlled by the judiciary. The desire of the
legislature to adequately compensate an individual injured by a tortious act of the state, has been counterbalanced by that body's determination to protect the public treasury from excessive claims. Thus,
any further exposure of the state to liability through the continued
abrogation of its immunity should originate within the legislative
branch rather than at the initiative of the judiciary. It is the judiciary's
responsibility, however, to administer and interpret the Act, and the
courts must therefore construe any existing areas of ambiguity and inconsistency which might otherwise inhibit its proper application. The
bench may also be expected to soon consider some of the potential constitutional issues presented by the Act. Judicial scrutiny of this intricate problem should not, in this regard, be impeded by the separation
of powers considerations which must weigh so heavily in its other
deliberations.
In enacting the New Jersey Tort Claims Act the legislature recognized "the inherently unfair and inequitable results which occur in the
209 Lynch, The New Jersey Supreme Court and the Counsel Fees Rule: Procedure or
Substance and Remedy?, 4 SroN HALL L. REv. 19, 26 (1972). See, e.g., DeBow v. Lakewood
Hotel & Land Ass'n, 52 N.J. Super. 288, 145 A.2d 493 (App. Div. 1958).
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210
strict application of the traditional doctrine of sovereign immunity."
At the same time, as a matter of public policy, that body declared that
liability be limited to the areas acknowledged by the Act "in accordance with [its] fair and uniform principles." 211 This state's legislature
and judiciary must move ahead towards effectuating this goal.

Arnold D. Litt
210 N.J. STAT. ANN.
211 Id.

§ 59:1-2 (Supp. 1973-74).

